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COMMON INFORMATION BASED MARKOV PERFECT
EQUILIBRIA FOR LINEAR-GAUSSIAN GAMES WITH
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
ABHISHEK GUPTA, ASHUTOSH NAYYAR, CÉDRIC LANGBORT, TAMER BAŞAR ∗
Abstract. We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where
the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are
Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic information about the state process
and the other controller’s past actions and observations. This leads to a dynamic game of asymmetric
information among the controllers. Building on our earlier work on finite games with asymmetric
information, we devise an algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium by using the common information
among the controllers. We call such equilibria common information based Markov perfect equilibria
of the game, which can be viewed as a refinement of Nash equilibrium in games with asymmetric
information. If the players’ cost functions are quadratic, then we show that under certain conditions a
unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium exists. Furthermore, this equilibrium
can be computed by solving a sequence of linear equations. We also show through an example that
there could be other Nash equilibria in a game of asymmetric information, not corresponding to
common information based Markov perfect equilibria.
1. Introduction. A game models a scenario where multiple strategic controllers
(or players) optimize their objective functionals, which depend not only on the self
actions but also on the actions of other controllers. In stochastic static games, players
observe the realization of some random state of nature, possibly through separate
noisy channels, and use such observations to independently determine their actions so
that the expected values of their individual cost (or utility) functions are optimized.
In a stochastic dynamic game, on the other hand, the players act at multiple time
steps, based on observation or measurement of some dynamic process which itself
is driven by past actions as well as random quantities, which could again be called
random states of nature. What information each player acquires at each stage of the
game determines what is called the information structure of the underlying game.
If all the players acquire the same information at each time step, then the dynamic
game is said to be a game of symmetric information. However, in many real scenarios,
the players do not have access to the same information about the underlying state
processes and other players’ observations and past actions. Such games are known
as games with asymmetric information. For example, several problems in economic
interactions [1–3], attacks on cyber-physical systems [4], auctions, cryptography, etc.
can be modeled as games of asymmetric information among strategic players.
Games with symmetric and/or perfect information have been well studied in the
literature; see, for example, [5–9]. In these games, the players have the same beliefs
on the states of the game, future observations and future expected costs or payoffs.
However, in games with asymmetric information, the players need not have the same
beliefs on the current state and future evolution of the game. General frameworks
to compute or refine Nash equilibria in stochastic games of symmetric or perfect
information have received attention from several researchers, see for example, [3,7,10]
among many others. However, by comparison, such general frameworks for games
of asymmetric information are scant (for exceptions, see [11–14]). This paper, in
addition to its earlier finite-game version [15], provides such a framework.
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In our recent work [15], we considered a general finite non-zero sum dynamic
stochastic game of asymmetric information with stagewise additive cost functions.
Under certain assumptions on the information structures of the players, we obtained a
characterization of a particular class of Nash equilibria using a dynamic programming
like approach. The key idea there was to use common information among the players
to transform the original game of asymmetric information to a game of symmetric
and perfect state information with an expanded state and action spaces of the players
so that a more easily computable Markov perfect equilibrium of the latter can be
used to obtain a Nash equilibrium for the former. The advantage of this technique is
that instead of searching for equilibrium in the (large) space of strategies (which grows
with the number of stages), we only need to compute Nash equilibrium in a succession
of static games of complete information. This reduces the computational effort in
computing a Nash equilibrium of the game. We call the Nash equilibria obtained
with this approach as common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
In this work, we extend the framework and results of [15] to infinite games, par-
ticularly those with linear state and observation equations and Gaussian random
variables. For quadratic cost functions of the players satisfying certain assumptions,
we show that a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium exists.
The general framework developed in the paper can be applied to obtain Nash equi-
libria of broader classes of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information,
satisfying two general assumptions delineated in the paper.
1.1. Previous Work. In the past, specific models of various classes of games
have been studied, where different players acquire different information. Harsanyi,
in his seminal paper [1], studied one subclass of static games with finite state and
action spaces of the players, and showed that under some technical conditions, Nash
equilibrium exists in such games. Various authors [16–18] have studied two-player
zero-sum differential games with linear state dynamics and quadratic payoffs, where
the players do not make the same measurements about the state. A zero sum differ-
ential game where one player’s observation is nested in the other player’s observation
was considered in [19]. A zero-sum differential game where one player makes a noisy
observation of the state while the other one does not make any measurement was
considered in [20].
Discrete-time non-zero sum LQG games with one step delayed sharing of obser-
vations were studied in [12] and [13]. A game with one-step delayed observation and
action sharing among the players was considered in [21]. A two-player finite game in
which the players do not have access to each other’s observations and control actions
was considered in [22], where a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a
Nash equilibrium in terms of two coupled dynamic programs was obtained.
Obtaining equilibrium solutions for stochastic games when players make inde-
pendent noisy observations of the state and do not share all of their information (or
even when they have access to the same noisy observation as in [23]) has remained a
challenge for general classes of games. Identifying classes of games which would lead
to tractable solutions or feasible solution methods is therefore an important goal in
this area.
1.2. Contributions of this Paper. This paper is a sequel to our earlier finite
game work in [15], where we make similar assumptions on the information structures
of the players. We study games in which the state, the players’ actions and primi-
tive random variables take values in finite-dimensional Euclidean spaces. The state
evolution and observation equations are taken to be linear in their arguments and
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all primitive random variables are assumed to be mutually independent zero-mean
Gaussian random variables. We assume that the players have a stagewise additive
total cost function.
We assume that the information structures of the players satisfy two sufficient
conditions. For any dynamic game satisfying these assumptions, we show that we
can decompose it into several static games using a backward induction algorithm.
If there exists a Nash equilibrium for each of those static games, then there exists a
common information based Markov perfect equilibrium for the original dynamic game.
Furthermore, we present an algorithm that computes the common information based
Markov perfect equilibrium in such games, provided that it exists. For games in which
the cost functions of the players are quadratic satisfying certain assumption, we show
that the static game at each time step admits a unique Nash equilibrium in the class
of all Borel measurable strategies of the players at that time step, thereby proving
the existence of a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium. We
also show, by example, that there may be other Nash equilibria of such games that
cannot be computed using the conceptual method developed in this paper.
To sum up, common information based Markov perfect equilibria constitute a
subclass of Nash equilibria of such games, and it can be thought of as a refinement of
Nash equilibrium for games with asymmetric information. However, we do not look
into implementation issues of common information based Markov perfect equilibrium
in this paper, and we leave this as a topic of further investigation.
1.3. Notation. Random variables are denoted by upper case letters and their
realizations by the corresponding lower case letters. Random vectors are denoted
by upper case bold letters and their realizations by lower case bold letters. Unless
otherwise stated, the state, action and observations are assumed to be vector valued.
Let X be a set. For a subset X ⊂ X , we let X∁ denote the complement of the set
X. We use idX to denote the identity map on the set X . The transpose of a matrix
A is denoted by A∗.
Subscripts are used as time indices and superscripts are used as player/controller
indices. Consider a, b ∈ N. Let Xt be an element of a finite dimensional Euclidean
space Xt for a ≤ t ≤ b. If a ≤ b, then we let Xa:b denote the set of vectors
{Xa,Xa+1, . . . ,Xb}. If a > b, then Xa:b is empty. On the other hand, we use
Xa:b to denote the product space
∏b
t=a Xt, which is a finite dimensional Euclidean
space, with the understanding that Xa:b = ∅ if a > b. We use a similar convention for
superscripts.
We use P{·} to denote the probability of an event and E[·] to denote the expec-
tation of a random variable. For a collection of functions g, the notations Pg{·} and
E
g[·] indicate that the probability/expectation depends on the choice of functions in
g. Similarly, for a probability measure π, the notation Eπ[·] indicates that the expec-
tation is with respect to the measure π. The notation 1{x} denotes a Dirac measure
at the point x. For a set X and its subset X, 1X : X → {0, 1} denotes the indicator
function on the set X.
Let X,Y and Z be three random variables taking values, respectively, in the
spaces X , Y and Z. Then, P{X|y, z} denotes the probability of the event X ⊂ X
given the realizations y and z of the random variables Y and Z. Similarly, E[·|y]
denotes the expected value of a real-valued function (·) given the realization y. We
use P{dx, dy|z} to denote the conditional probability measure over the space X × Y
given a realization z of another random variable Z.
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1.4. Outline of the Paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we formulate the two-player non-zero sum game problem with linear dynamics, linear
observation equations, and asymmetric information among the players. We make two
assumptions on the information structures of the controllers and an assumption on
the admissible strategies of the agents. We also discuss consequences of the assump-
tions we make on the information structures. In Section 3, we state the main result
of the paper and develop a backward induction algorithm that computes the common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium of the game formulated in Section 2,
provided that it exists. In Section 4, we specialize the result of Section 3 to LQG
games, and show that under further assumptions on cost functions, a unique common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium exists in the class of measurable strate-
gies of the players. In Section 5, we show through an example that there may be other
Nash equilibria of a game with asymmetric information, and that using our algorithm,
we compute only a subclass of all Nash equilibria. We discuss some implications of
our assumptions in Section 6. Finally, we conclude our discussion in Section 7 and
identify several directions for future research. Proofs of most of the results in the
paper are given in appendices.
2. Problem Formulation. Let Xt be the state of a linear system which is
controlled by two controllers (players)1. At each time step t, Controller i, i = 1, 2,
observes the state through a noisy sensor; this observation is denoted by Yit. Con-
troller i’s action at time step t is denoted by Uit. For each Controller i ∈ {1, 2} at
time t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1}, the state, action and observation spaces are denoted by Xt, U it
and Yit , respectively, and they are assumed to be finite dimensional Euclidean spaces.
The dynamics and observation equations are given as
Xt+1 = AtXt +B
1
tU
1
t +B
2
tU
2
t +W
0
t , (2.1)
Yit = H
i
tXt +W
i
t, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
where Wit is a random variable taking values in a finite dimensional Euclidean space
denoted byW it for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T−1}, and At, B
i
t, H
i
t , i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1} are matrices of appropriate dimensions. X1,W0:21:T−1 are primitive
random variables, and they are assumed to be mutually independent and zero-mean
Gaussian random vectors.
2.1. Information Structures of the Controllers. The information available
to each controller at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T−1} is a subset of all information generated
in the past, that is, {Y1:21:t ,U
1:2
1:t−1}. Let E
i
t and F
i
t , respectively, be defined as
E it := {(j, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, . . . , T } : Controller i at time t knows Y
j
s},
F it := {(j, s) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, . . . , T } : Controller i at time t knows U
j
s}.
1In the paper, we use the term “controller” instead of “player”, because we introduce another set
of players in the symmetric information game introduced in the next section.
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Define Iit , Ct and P
i
t for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} as
Iit =
∏
(j,s)∈Eit
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈Fit
Ujs ,
Ct =
∏
(j,s)∈E1t ∩E
2
t
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈F1t ∩F
2
t
Ujs ,
P it =
∏
(j,s)∈Eit\(E
1
t ∩E
2
t )
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈Fit\(F
1
t ∩F
2
t )
Ujs .
Note that Iit , Ct and P
i
t for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} are finite dimensional
Euclidean spaces.
We let Iit ∈ I
i
t denote the information available to Controller i at time step
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, which is a vector comprised of measurements and control actions
that are observed by the controller. The common information of the controllers at a
time step is defined as the vector of all random variables that are observed by both
controllers at that time step. The private information of a controller at a time step
is the vector of random variables that are not observed by the other controller. The
common information is denoted by Ct ∈ Ct, and the private information of Controller
i is denoted by Pit ∈ P
i
t at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T }.
A dynamic game is said to be one of symmetric information if Ct = I
1
t = I
2
t at
all time steps. We are interested in games where the controllers may have asymmetry
in information, that is, I1t 6= I
2
t . An extreme example of a game of asymmetric
information is the case when P1t 6= ∅ while P
2
t = ∅ for all time steps t. Another
example of a game of asymmetric information is when the controllers recall their
past information and share their observations after a delay of one time step, that is,
Ct = Y1:21:t−1 and P
i
t = Y
i
t for all time steps t.
2.2. Admissible Strategies of Controllers. At every time step, Controller i
uses a control law git : P
i
t × Ct → U
i
t to map its information to its action. We assume
that the control law git is a Borel measurable function, and denote the space of all
such control laws by Git .
A strategy of Controller i, which we define as the collection of its control laws
over time, is denoted by gi = (gi1, . . . , g
i
T−1) and the space of strategies of Controller
i is denoted by Gi1:T−1. The pair of strategies of both controllers, (g
1,g2) ∈ G11:T−1 ×
G21:T−1, is called the strategy profile of the controllers.
The total cost to Controller i, as a function of the strategy profile of the controllers,
is
J i(g1,g2) := E
[
ciT (xT ) +
T−1∑
t=1
cit(xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t )
]
,
where cit is a non-negative continuous function of its arguments for i ∈ {1, 2} and
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, and the expectation is taken with respect to the probability
measure on the state and action processes induced by the choice of strategy profile
(g1,g2).
A strategy profile (g1,g2) is said to be a Nash equilibrium of the game if it satisfies
the following two inequalities
J1(g1,g2) ≤ J1(g˜1,g2), and J2(g1,g2) ≤ J2(g1, g˜2),
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for all admissible strategies g˜1 ∈ G11:T−1 and g˜
2 ∈ G21:T−1.
We assume that the state evolution equations, observation equations, the noise
statistics, cost functions of the controllers and the information structures of the con-
trollers are part of common knowledge. The game thus defined is referred to as game
G1.
2.3. Assumption on Evolution of Information. As noted above, each con-
troller’s information consists of common information and private information. We
place the following condition on the evolution of common and private information of
the controllers in game G1.
Assumption 1. The common and private information evolve over time as fol-
lows:
1. The common information increases with time, that is, (E1t ∩E
2
t ) ⊂ (E
1
t+1∩E
2
t+1)
and (F1t ∩ F
2
t ) ⊂ (F
1
t+1 ∩ F
2
t+1) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Let D1,t+1 :=
(E1t+1 ∩ E
2
t+1) \ (E
1
t ∩ E
2
t ) and D2,t+1 := (F
1
t+1 ∩ F
2
t+1) \ (F
1
t ∩ F
2
t ). Define
Zt+1 =
∏
(j,s)∈D1,t+1
Yjs ×
∏
(j,s)∈D2,t+1
Ujs . (2.3)
Then, Zt+1 ∈ Zt+1 denotes the increment in common information from time
t to t+ 1 and we have
Zt+1 = ζt+1([P
1∗
t ,P
2∗
t ,U
1∗
t ,U
2∗
t ,Y
1∗
t+1,Y
2∗
t+1]
∗), (2.4)
where ζt+1 is an appropriate projection function.
2. The private information evolves according to the equation
Pit+1 = ξ
i
t+1([P
i∗
t ,U
i∗
t ,Y
i∗
t+1]
∗). (2.5)
where ξit+1 is an appropriate projection function.
We now introduce a few notations in order to prove an important result. Let
St := Xt × P1t × P
2
t for t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Fix the strategy profile of the controllers
as (g1,g2). Let Πt be the conditional measure on the space of state and private
informations, St, given the common information Ct at time step t. Thus,
Πt(dst) = P
g1:21:t−1
{
dst
∣∣∣Ct} ,
where the superscript denotes the fact that the probability measure depends on the
choice of control laws. The conditional probability measure Πt is a Ct-measurable
random variable, whose realization, denoted by πt, depends on the realization ct of
the common information. We now have the following result, which is a consequence
of Assumption 1.
Let Γit be a random measurable function from P
i
t to U
i
t defined as Γ
i
t(·) := g
i
t(·,Ct)
for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, where the realization of Γit is denoted by γ
i
t and it
depends on the realization of the random variable Ct. Thus, g
i
t(P
i
t, ct) = γ
i
t(P
i
t). We
now have the following result about the evolution of conditional measure Πt.
Lemma 2.1. Fix the strategy profile (g1,g2) ∈ G11:T−1 ×G
2
1:T−1. If Assumption 1
holds, then
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Γ
1
t ,Γ
2
t ,Zt+1),
where Ft is a fixed transformation which does not depend on the choice of control
laws.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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2.4. Strategy Independence of Beliefs. A crucial assumption, which forms
the basis of the analysis in this paper, is the following.
Assumption 2 (Strategy Independence of Beliefs). At any time t and for any
realization of common information ct, the conditional probability measure πt on the
state Xt and the private information (P
1
t ,P
2
t ) given the common information does
not depend on the choice of control laws. In particular, if zt+1 is a realization of the
increment in the common information at time step t+1, then πt+1 evolves according
to the equation
πt+1 = Ft(πt, zt+1), (2.6)
where Ft is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the control laws.
Assumption 2 allows us to define the conditional belief πt without specifying the
control laws used. Another important consequence of Assumption 2 is that these con-
ditional beliefs on the state and private information admit Gaussian density functions.
We make this precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2. For any time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T } and any realization of common
information ct, the common information based conditional measure πt admits a Gaus-
sian density function.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We henceforth call πt as common information based conditional belief. In the
next subsection, we prove a result on the evolution of the mean and variance of the
common information based conditional beliefs.
2.5. Evolution of Conditional Beliefs. Since the common information based
conditional belief πt admits a Gaussian density at any time step t, πt is completely
characterized by its mean mt and the covariance matrix Σt. The conditional co-
variance of a collection of jointly Gaussian random variables is data independent.
Assumption 2 allows us to derive the following result for game G1.
Lemma 2.3. The evolution of the conditional mean
Mt := (M
0
t ,M
1
t ,M
2
t ) = (E[Xt|Ct],E[P
1
t |Ct],E[P
2
t |Ct])
of the density function of common information based conditional belief is given as
Mt+1 = F
1
t (Mt,Zt+1), (2.7)
where F 1t is a fixed affine transformation that does not depend on the strategies of the
controllers. The evolution of conditional covariance matrix Σt is given as
Σt+1 = F
2
t (Σt), (2.8)
where F 2t is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the strategies of the con-
trollers.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Examples of several classes of games that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 are given
in [15]. For example, if each controller acquires the realizations of the observations and
the actions of the other controller with zero or one-step delay, then the corresponding
game satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
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3. Main Results. Following the approach introduced in [15], we now construct
a new game G2 with two virtual players, where at every time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1},
each virtual player observes the common information Ct, but not the private informa-
tion of the controllers. Since the common information is nested (by Assumption 1),
gameG2 is a game of perfect recall. This game is intricately related to gameG1, and
we exploit the symmetric information structure of gameG2 to devise a computational
scheme to compute a Nash equilibrium of game G1. The steps taken to devise the
scheme are as follows:
1. We formulate game G2 in the next three subsections. Further, we show that
the common information based conditional mean Mt is a Markov state of
game G2 at time t.
2. In Subsection 3.4, we show that any Nash equilibrium of game G2 can be
used to obtain a Nash equilibrium of game G1, and vice-versa.
3. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria of game G2 and provide a backward
induction characterization of such equilibria. An equilibrium of game G1
obtained from a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 is called common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1.
4. We interpret the backward induction characterization of common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium in terms of a sequence of one-stage Bayesian
games.
We now turn our attention to formulating game G2. At time step t and for
each realization ct of the common information, virtual player i selects a measurable
function γit : P
i
t → U
i
t . The action space of virtual player i at time t is denoted by
Ait, and it is defined as
Ait := {γ
i
t : P
i
t → U
i
t such that γ
i
t is a Borel measurable map}. (3.1)
We call the actions taken by virtual players as “prescriptions” due to the following
reason: After observing the common information ct at time step t, virtual player i ∈
{1, 2} computes the equilibrium prescription γit ∈ A
i
t, and prescribes it to Controller
i. The controllers evaluate the prescriptions based on the realizations of their private
informations, to compute their actions at that time step.
3.1. Admissible Strategies of Virtual Players in Game G2. A map χit :
Ct → Ait denotes the control law of virtual player i ∈ {1, 2} at time step t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1}. The control law χit maps common information at time t to a prescrip-
tion, which itself maps private information of Controller i at time t to the control
action of Controller i. Thus, a choice of χit induces a map from Ct × P
i
t to U
i
t , which
we denote by χit(·)(·). We say χ
i
t is admissible if
χit(·)(·) is a Borel measurable function from Ct × P
i
t to U
i
t .
The set of all such admissible control laws is denoted by Hit, i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1}. The collection of control laws at all time steps of virtual player i is
called the strategy of that virtual player, and it is denoted by χi := {χi1, . . . , χ
i
T−1}.
The space of all strategies of the virtual player i, denoted by Hi1:T−1, is called the
strategy space of that virtual player. A strategy tuple (χ1, χ2) is called the strategy
profile of virtual players.
Definition 3.1. For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T−1}, let ̺it : H
i
t → G
i
t be an oper-
ator that takes a function χit : Ct → A
i
t as its input and returns a measurable function
git : P
i
t × Ct → U
i
t as its output, that is g
i
t = ̺
i
t(χ
i
t), such that g
i
t(p
i
t, ct) := χ
i
t(ct)(p
i
t)
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for all ct ∈ Ct and pit ∈ P
i
t . For a collection of functions χ
i := {χi1, . . . , χ
i
T−1}, let
̺i(χi) be defined as the set {̺i1(χ
i
1), . . . , ̺
i
T−1(χ
i
T−1)}.
Similarly, we let ςit : G
i
t → H
i
t be the operator such that ς
i
t ◦ ̺
i
t = idHit and
̺it ◦ ς
i
t = idGit . Thus, for g
i
t ∈ G
i
t , if χ
i
t = ς
i
t (g
i
t), then χ
i
t(ct)(p
i
t) := g
i
t(p
i
t, ct) for all
ct ∈ Ct and pit ∈ P
i
t . Similar to the expression above, for a collection of functions
gi := {gi1, . . . , g
i
T−1}, let ς
i(gi) be defined as the set {ςi1(g
i
1), . . . , ς
i
T−1(g
i
T−1)}. 
3.2. Cost Functions for Virtual Players. The cost functions of the virtual
players are defined as follows: Fix a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and a virtual
player i. Let π denote a normal distribution on the space St = Xt × P1t × P
2
t with
mean m and variance Σt, where Σt is given by the result in Lemma 2.3, and let
(γ1, γ2) be a prescription pair chosen by the virtual players. Define the cost function
c˜it : St ×A
1
t ×A
2
t → R+ of virtual player i at that time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} to be
c˜it(m, γ
1, γ2) =
∫
St
cit(xt, γ
1(p1t ), γ
2(p2t ))π(dst),
where one can view xt,p
1
t and p
2
t as appropriate projections of the variable st. We
now define the cost function of the virtual players at the final time step. Let π be
a Gaussian distribution with mean m and variance ΣT . The cost functions of the
virtual players at the final time step is c˜iT (m) =
∫
XT
ciT (xT )π(dxT ). The total cost
for virtual player i is given by
J˜ i(χ1, χ2) = E
[
c˜iT (MT ) +
T−1∑
t=1
c˜it(Mt,Γ
1
t ,Γ
2
t )
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure induced on
the mean of common information based conditional belief by the choice of strategies
(χ1, χ2). We have the following claim about the expected cost of game G2 given a
pair of strategy profiles of controllers in game G1 and vice versa.
Lemma 3.2. Let (g1,g2) ∈ G11:T−1 × G
2
1:T−1, and let (χ
1, χ2) be defined as χi :=
ςi(gi), i = 1, 2. Then, J i(g1,g2) = J˜ i(χ1, χ2) for i = 1, 2.
Conversely, let (χ1, χ2) ∈ H11:T−1 × H
2
1:T−1, and let (g
1,g2) be defined as gi :=
̺i(χi), i = 1, 2. Then, J˜ i(χ1, χ2) = J i(g1,g2) for i = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix D.
3.3. A Markov State of Game G2. Recall from Lemma 2.3 that given a
realization ct of common information, the common information based conditional
belief P{dst|ct} admits a Gaussian density function with mean mt and variance Σt.
Our next result is that the mean Mt is a controlled Markov chain, and it is controlled
by the actions taken (that is, the prescriptions chosen) by the virtual players.
Lemma 3.3. The process {Mt}t∈{1,...,T} is a controlled Markov process with the
virtual players’ prescriptions as the controlling actions. In particular, conditioned
on the realization mt of Mt and the prescriptions (γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) of the virtual players, the
conditional mean Mt+1 at the next time step is independent of the current common
information, the past conditional means and past prescriptions. Equivalently, this fact
is expressed as
P{Mt+1 ∈Mt+1|ct,m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t } = P{Mt+1 ∈Mt+1|mt, γ
1:2
t }
for all Borel sets Mt+1 ⊂ St+1.
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Proof. See Appendix E.
It should be noted that the update equation of the Markov process Mt is induced
by the state dynamics, observation equations, and information structure of the con-
trollers of game G1. The main differences between the structures of the two games
G1 and G2 are summarized in the table below.
At time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} Game G1 Game G2
State of the game Xt ∈ Xt Mt ∈ St
Action of Player i Uit ∈ U
i
t γ
i
t ∈ A
i
t
Information of Player i Iit ∈ I
i
t Ct ∈ Ct
Cost function of Player i cit c˜
i
t
Since both virtual players observe the same information (the common information
between the controllers) and the common information always increases by Assumption
1, game G2 between virtual players is a game of symmetric information with perfect
recall.
3.4. Relation between Games G1 and G2. In the next theorem, we show
that any Nash equilibrium of game G1 can be used to compute a Nash equilibrium
for game G2 and vice versa.
Theorem 3.4. Let (χ1⋆, χ2⋆) be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G2.
Then, the strategy profile (g1⋆,g2⋆) for game G1, defined as gi⋆ = ̺i(χi⋆), i = 1, 2,
forms a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G1. Conversely, if (g1⋆,g2⋆) is
a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of game G1, then the strategy profile (χ1⋆, χ2⋆),
defined by χi⋆ := ςi(gi⋆), i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile for game G2.
Proof. See Appendix F.
In light of the theorem above, we want to compute a Nash equilibrium of game
G2, and then project the solution back to the original game using the operators ̺1
and ̺2 as introduced in Definition 3.1.
Since at any time step t, both virtual players observe the common information
Ct, the virtual players can compute the mean Mt of the common information based
conditional belief. Since the mean Mt is a Markov state of game G2 and both virtual
players know its realization, game G2 is a game of perfect state information. Also
note that in gameG2, the cost functions of the virtual players are stagewise-additive.
A natural solution concept to compute the Nash equilibrium of a game of perfect
information with stagewise-additive cost function is Markov perfect equilibrium [7].
We define the Markov perfect equilibrium of G2 in the next subsection and prove the
main result of the section.
3.5. Markov Perfect Equilibrium of Game G2. Fix virtual player i’s control
laws χi1:T−1 such that the prescription at time step t is only a function of Mt, say
χit(Ct) = ψ
i
t(Mt) for some function ψ
i
t : St → A
i
t, such that ψ
i
t(·)(·) is a measurable
function from St × P
i
t to U
i
t at all time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Let us use H¯
i
t to
denote the set of all such maps ψit, and note that H¯
i
t ⊂ H
i
t. Then, virtual player j’s,
j 6= i, (one-person) optimization problem is to minimize its stagewise additive cost
functional that depends on Mt and on virtual player i’s fixed strategy. Thus, virtual
player j needs to solve a finite horizon Markov decision problem with state space St
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and action space Ajt at time step t. This is made precise in our next result.
Lemma 3.5. Consider game G2 among virtual players. Assume that virtual
player i is using the strategy {ψi1, . . . , ψ
i
T−1} ∈ H¯
i
1:T−1, that is, virtual player i selects
the prescriptions at time step t only as a function of the mean Mt of the common
information based conditional belief Πt:
Γit = ψ
i
t(Mt), t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}.
Then, for the fixed strategy of virtual player i, virtual player j’s (j 6= i, j ∈ {1, 2})
one-sided optimization problem is a finite horizon Markov decision problem with state
Mt, control action γ
j
t , and cost as c˜
j
t (Mt, γ
j
t , ψ
i
t(Mt)) at time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
and terminal cost c˜jT (MT ).
Proof. See Appendix G.
Note that game G2 is a dynamic game of perfect information and perfect recall.
A Markov strategy of a virtual player is defined as a collection of control laws of that
virtual player at all time steps such that the control law at time step t is a measurable
map of common information based conditional mean (state of game G2) to its action
space at that time step. Lemma 3.5 states that if one virtual player sticks to Markov
strategy, then the other virtual player’s one-sided optimization problem is a finite
horizon Markov decision problem. Under certain assumptions on the cost functions
of the virtual players2, there exists a Markov strategy of the other virtual player that
achieves the minimum in its Markov decision problem. Thus, there is no incentive for
the other virtual player to search for optimal strategies outside the class of Markov
strategies. This is an important observation for game G2, because one can define a
refinement concept for Nash equilibrium, called Markov perfect equilibrium [7], for
game G2.
Definition 3.6. A strategy profile (ψ1⋆1:T−1, ψ
2⋆
1:T−1) ∈ H
1
1:T−1 × H
2
1:T−1 is said
to be a Markov perfect equilibrium [7] of game G2 if (i) at each time t, the control
laws of the virtual players at time step t are functions of the mean of the common
information based conditional belief Mt, that is, ψ
i
t ∈ H¯
i
t, and (ii) for all time steps
t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, the strategy profiles (ψ1⋆t:T−1, ψ
2⋆
t:T−1) form a Nash equilibrium for
the sub-game starting at time step t of game G2.
It should be noted that Markov perfect equilibrium is a refinement concept for
Nash equilibria of games in which players make perfect state observations. In game
G2 among virtual players, a strategy profile that is not a Markov perfect equilibrium
either depends on the common information (and not just on the mean Mt), or is not
a Nash equilibrium of every sub-game in game G2, or both. We reemphasize this
point later in Section 5.
Given a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2, we can construct a corresponding
Nash equilibrium of game G1 using Theorem 3.4. We refer to the class of Nash
equilibria of G1 that can be constructed from the Markov perfect equilibria of G2
as the common information based Markov perfect equilibria of game G1.
Definition 3.7. If (ψ1⋆1:T−1, ψ
2⋆
1:T−1) is a Markov perfect equilibrium of game
G2, then the strategy profile (g1⋆,g2⋆) of the form gi⋆ = ̺i(ψi⋆1:T−1), i = 1, 2, is called
common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1. 
A similar concept was introduced for finite games with asymmetric information
in our earlier work [15].
2See, for example, [24, Section 3.3] for a set of such assumptions.
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3.6. Computation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium of Game G2. In this
subsection, we characterize Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 using value func-
tions that depend on the mean of the common information based conditional belief.
Theorem 3.8. Consider a strategy pair (ψ1⋆1:T−1, ψ
2⋆
1:T−1) ∈ H¯
1
1:T−1 × H¯
2
1:T−1.
Define functions V it : Xt×P
1
t ×P
2
t → R, called expected value functions of Controller
i at time t, as follows:
1. For each possible realization m = (m0,m1,m2) of MT , define the value
functions:
V iT (m) := c˜
i
T (m) = E[c
i
T (XT )|MT = m] i ∈ {1, 2}. (3.2)
2. For t = T − 1, . . . , 1, and for each possible realization m of Mt, define the
value functions:
V it (m) := min
γ˜it∈A
i
t
E
[
c˜it(Mt, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) + V
i
t+1(F
1
t (Mt,Zt+1))∣∣∣Mt = m, γit = γ˜it , γ−it = ψ−i⋆t (m)] i ∈ {1, 2}, (3.3)
assuming that the minimum exists in the equation above. Then, a necessary
and sufficient condition for (ψ1⋆1:T−1, ψ
2⋆
1:T−1) to be a Markov perfect equilib-
rium of G2 is that for every time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, i ∈ {1, 2} and for
every realization m of Mt,
ψi⋆t (m) ∈ argmin
γ˜it∈A
i
t
E
[
c˜it(m, γ˜
i
t , ψ
−i⋆
t (m)) + V
i
t+1(F
1
t (m,Zt+1))
]
. (3.4)
Proof. See Appendix H.
To show that the sub-game admits a Nash equilibrium at time step t requires
a fixed-point argument, which means that the reaction curves of the virtual players
intersect in the product of their strategy spaces H¯1t × H¯
2
t [8]. In the next section,
we show that if the cost functions of the players are quadratic functions of their
arguments, then under certain conditions on the cost functions, the reaction curves
of the virtual players intersect at a unique point. Thus, under those assumptions, a
unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium exists in LQG games
with asymmetric information.
Remark 1. As stated earlier, Markov perfect equilibrium is only a subclass of
Nash equilibria of game G2. Game G2 (and equivalently, the corresponding game
G1) may have several other Nash equilibria besides Markov perfect equilibrium. An
example of a two-player two-stage game of asymmetric information in which there is
a continuum of Nash equilibria is presented in Section 5. 
3.7. One-stage Bayesian Games. At any time step t, let mt and xt, respec-
tively, be realizations of the common information based conditional mean and the
state. Let us rewrite the expressions of the expected cost-to-go functions in (3.3) as
c¯it(mt;xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t ) := c
i
t(xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t ) + E
[
V it+1(F
1
t (mt,Zt+1))
∣∣∣xt,u1t ,u2t ] . (3.5)
These are the cost-to-go functions for the two controllers in game G1 if both con-
trollers stick to the common information based Markov perfect equilibrium for all time
step s > t. For a realization mt, Controller i chooses a map γ
i
t : P
i
t → U
i
t . We assume
that the probability measure on Xt × P1t × P
2
t admits a Gaussian density function
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with mean mt and variance Σt. One can notice that this is precisely the setup of a
Bayesian game. Therefore, we say that the game between Controllers 1 and 2, with
cost functions c¯1t (mt; ·) and c¯
2
t (mt; ·), respectively, is the one-stage Bayesian game at
time step t with mean mt.
An algorithm to compute common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium:
We can now describe a backward induction process to find a common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1 using a sequence of one-stage Bayesian
games. We proceed as follows:
Algorithm 1:
1. At the terminal time T −1, for each realizationm of the common information
based conditional mean at time T − 1, we define a one-stage Bayesian game
SGT−1(m) where
(a) The probability distribution on (XT−1,P
1
T−1,P
2
T−1), denoted by π, is
a Gaussian distribution with mean m and covariance ΣT−1.
(b) Agent3 i observes PiT−1 and chooses action U
i
T−1, i = 1, 2.
(c) Agent i’s cost is c¯iT−1(m;XT−1,U
1
T−1,U
2
T−1), i = 1, 2.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium4 of this game is a pair of strategies (γ1∗, γ2∗),
where γi∗ : P iT−1 → U
i
T−1 is a measurable function such that for any realiza-
tion pi ∈ P iT−1, γ
i∗(pi) is a solution of the minimization problem
min
ui
E
π [c¯iT−1(m;XT−1,u
i, γj∗(PjT−1))|P
i
T−1 = p
i],
where j 6= i and the superscript π denotes that the expectation is with respect
to the distribution π. If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (γ1∗, γ2∗) of SGT−1(m)
exists, denote the corresponding expected equilibrium costs as V iT−1(m), i =
1, 2, and define ψiT (m) := γ
i∗, i = 1, 2.
2. At time t < T − 1, for each realization m of the common information based
conditional mean at time t, we define the one-stage Bayesian game SGt(m)
where
(a) The probability distribution on (Xt,P
1
t ,P
2
t ), denoted by π, admits a
Gaussian density function with mean m and covariance Σt.
(b) Agent i observes Pit and chooses action U
i
t, i = 1, 2.
(c) Agent i’s cost is c¯it(m;Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t ), i = 1, 2.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies (γ1∗, γ2∗),
where γi∗ : P iT−1 → U
i
T−1 is a measurable function such that for any realiza-
tion pi ∈ P it , γ
i∗(pi) is a solution of the minimization problem
min
ui
E
π[c¯it(m;Xt,u
i, γj(Pjt ))|P
i
t = p
i],
where j 6= i, i, j = 1, 2, when control actions Uit = u
i and Ujt = γ
j(Pjt )
are used. The expectation is taken with respect to the Gaussian distribution
with mean m and covariance Σt. If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (γ
1∗, γ2∗)
of SGt(m) exists, denote the corresponding expected equilibrium costs as
V it (m), i = 1, 2 and define ψ
i
t(m) := γ
i∗, i = 1, 2.
3Agent i can be thought to be the same as Controller i. We use a different name here in order
to maintain the distinction between games G1 and SGT−1(m).
4See [7, 25, 26] for a definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 3.9. The strategies ψi = (ψi1, ψ
i
2, . . . , ψ
i
T−1), i = 1, 2, defined by the
backward induction process described in Algorithm 1 form a Markov perfect equilibrium
of game G2. Consequently, strategies g1 and g2 defined as
git(·, ct) := ψ
i
t(mt), i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
form a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of game G1.
Proof. To prove the result, we just need to observe that the strategies defined by
the backward induction procedure of Algorithm 1 satisfy the conditions of Theorem
3.8 and hence form a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2.
In the next section, we consider LQG games, in which the cost functions of the
controllers at any time step are quadratic in the state and actions of the controllers.
Under certain sufficient conditions on the cost functions of the controllers, we prove
that the one-stage Bayesian game at any time t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} with any mean
mt ∈ St admits a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We follow the steps of the
algorithm above to prove that every LQG game with cost functions satisfying certain
conditions admits a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
4. Game with Quadratic Cost Functions. Let us now consider the special
class of games where the stagewise cost functions ciT and c
i
t are quadratic functions
of their arguments:
ciT (XT ) = X
∗
TR
i
11XT , c
i
t(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t ) =
[
X∗t ,U
1∗
t ,U
2∗
t
]
Ri

XtU1t
U2t


where Ri :=

Ri11 Ri12 Ri13Ri∗12 Ri22 Ri23
Ri∗13 R
i∗
23 R
i
33

 ,
Ri11 ≥ 0 and R
i
ii > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. We refer to Gaussian games in which the cost
functions are of the form above as dynamic LQG games.
Before we analyze the dynamic LQG game, we first formulate and compute the
Nash equilibrium of a static auxiliary (Bayesian) game in the next subsection. We
use the result of this auxiliary game to compute the Nash equilibrium strategies of
the dynamic game. One of the main results of this section is that any LQG game
that satisfies a certain assumption on the cost functions in addition to Assumptions 1
and 2 admits a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium in the
class of all Borel measurable strategy profiles of the controllers. We prove this in two
steps:
1. The first step consists of computing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a par-
ticular two-player static game with asymmetric information. This is done in
Subsection 4.1.
2. We then exploit the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, the structure of the Nash
equilibrium strategies of the controllers, and the expected equilibrium costs
to the controllers to obtain the main result for LQG games in Subsection 4.2.
4.1. An Auxiliary Game, AG1. The static Bayesian game is described as
follows: X,Y1,Y2 are jointly Gaussian random vectors such that Yi = HiX for some
matrix Hi of appropriate dimensions. The mean and covariance of the three-tuple
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X,Y1,Y2 are given by
m =

mxmy1
my2

 Σ =

Σxx Σxy1 Σxy2Σy1x Σy1y1 Σy1y2
Σy2x Σy2y1 Σy2y2

 ,
where Σyiyj = Σ
1
2
yiyi
Σ
1
2
∗
yjyj
, Σyix = Σ
1
2
yiyi
Σ
1
2
∗
xx for i, j = 1, 2. (4.1)
Since X,Y1,Y2 are jointly Gaussian random variables, the conditional expectations
E[X|Yi] and E[Y−i|Yi] are affine functions of Yi, given by
E[X|Yi] = mx +ΣxyiΣ
−1
yiyi
(Yi −myi), (4.2)
E[Y−i|Yi] = my−i +Σy−iyiΣ
−1
yiyi
(Yi −myi), (4.3)
where Σ−1
yiyi
is the generalized inverse (pseudo inverse) of Σyiyi [27] for i = 1, 2.
The cost functions are
c1(X,U1,U2) =
[
X
∗,U1∗,U2∗
]
C

 XU1
U
2

+ 2 [d1, d2, d3]

 XU1
U
2

+ r1, (4.4)
c2(X,U1,U2) =
[
X
∗,U1∗,U2∗
]
E

 XU1
U
2

+ 2 [f1, f2, f3]

 XU1
U
2

+ r2, (4.5)
where C =

C11 C12 C13C∗12 C22 C23
C∗13 C
∗
23 C33

 and E =

E11 E12 E13E∗12 E22 E23
E∗13 E
∗
23 E33

 .
with C ≥ 0, E ≥ 0, C22 > 0, E33 > 0, Cij , Eij are matrices, di, fi are row vectors of
appropriate dimensions and r1, r2 are scalar constants.
Controller i observes Yi, i = 1, 2 and selects Ui according to a decision rule gi, that
is, Ui = gi(Yi), where gi is a measurable function of Y i satisfying E[gi∗(Yi)gi(Yi)] <
∞. Let the space of all such measurable functions gi be denoted by AGi. This game
is referred to as game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2). We make the following assumption on the
cost functions of the controllers in AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2).
Assumption 3. For any square matrix A, let λ¯(A) denotes the positive square
root of the maximum eigenvalue of A∗A. For the matrix tuple (C,E), define K1 =
C−122 C23E
−1
33 E
∗
23 and K2 = E
−1
33 E
∗
23C
−1
22 C23. Let Ki be the space of all matrices that are
similar to Ki, i = 1, 2, that is, K˜ ∈ Ki implies there exists a square invertible matrix
L of appropriate dimensions such that K˜ = LKiL
−1. There exists an i0 ∈ {1, 2} and
a matrix K ∈ Ki0 such that λ¯(K) < 1. 
In the next lemma, which builds on and follows from the earlier results in [11,
13], we show that the Nash equilibrium of the auxiliary game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2) that
satisfies Assumption 3 exists in the space AG1 ×AG2, is unique, and is affine in the
information of the controllers.
Lemma 4.1. The following statements hold:
1. For the 1-stage game AG1, a pair of decision rules g1⋆, g2⋆ is a Nash equi-
librium if and only if they simultaneously satisfy the following two equations,
g1⋆(Y1) = −C−122 d
∗
2 − C
−1
22 C
∗
12E[X|Y
1]− C−122 C23E[g
2⋆(Y2)|Y1],
g2⋆(Y2) = −E−133 f
∗
3 − E
−1
33 E
∗
13E[X|Y
2]− E−133 E
∗
23E[g
1⋆(Y1)|Y2].
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2. If the matrices (C,E) in the cost functions of game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2) satisfy
Assumption 3, then the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in the class of
all Borel measurable strategies AG1 ×AG2, given as
gi⋆(Yi) = T i(Yi −myi) + b
i, (4.6)
where b1, b2 are solutions of the following pair of equations
b1 = −C−122 [d
∗
2 + C12mx + C23b
2],
b2 = −E−133 [f
∗
3 + E13mx + E
∗
23b
1],
and are of the form
b1 = l1 + L1mx, b
2 = l2 + L2mx, (4.7)
and T 1, T 2 are solutions of the following pair of equations
T 1 = −C−122 [C
∗
12Σxy1Σ
−1
y1y1
+ C23T
2Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1
], (4.8)
T 2 = −E−133 [E
∗
13Σxy2Σ
−1
y2y2
+ E∗23T
1Σy1y2Σ
−1
y2y2
]. (4.9)
Here, li and Li are independent of m for both i = 1, 2.
3. The expected costs to the controllers when they play according to Nash equi-
librium (g1⋆, g2⋆) are
E[ci(X, g1⋆(Y1), g2⋆(Y2))] = m∗Φim+ Ξim+Υi, (4.10)
where the matrices Φi, Ξi and Υi for i = 1, 2 are defined by
L˜ :=

 0 0 0L1 −T 1 0
L2 0 −T 2

 , T˜ :=

I 0 00 T 1 0
0 0 T 2

 , l˜ :=

0l1
l2

 ,
Φ1 = (T˜ + L˜)∗C(T˜ + L˜), Ξ1 = 2l˜∗C(T˜ + L˜) + 2[d1, d2, d3](T˜ + L˜),
Φ2 = (T˜ + L˜)∗E(T˜ + L˜), Ξ2 = 2l˜∗E(T˜ + L˜) + 2[f1, f2, f3](T˜ + L˜),
Υ1 = r1 + 2[d1, d2, d3]l˜ + trace
(
T˜ ∗CT˜Σ
)
+ 2l˜∗Cl˜,
Υ1 = r2 + 2[f1, f2, f3]l˜ + trace
(
T˜ ∗ET˜Σ
)
+ 2l˜∗El˜.
Proof. Part 1 of the lemma is proved by differentiating E
[
ci(X,Ui, g−i(Y−i))|Yi
]
with respect to Ui and setting it equal to zero. For the proof of Part 2 of the lemma,
see Appendix I. For proving Part 3 of the lemma, notice that if Ui = gi⋆(Yi) for
i = 1, 2, then 
 XU1
U
2

 = T˜

 XY1
Y
2

+ L˜m+ l˜.
Now, substituting this in the expressions for c1 and c2 and taking the expectations,
we get the expected costs of the controllers. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Remark 2. The Nash equilibrium strategy of Player i given in (4.6) of the
auxiliary game AG1 can be rewritten as
gi⋆(Yi) =
[
li + Limx − T imyi | T
i
] [ 1
Y
i
]
.
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It should also be noted that the unique Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary game AG1
exists in the class of all Borel measurable strategies of the controllers. 
In the next subsection, we consider a class of dynamic LQG games satisfying
certain assumptions, and show that each LQG game in that class admits a unique
common information based Markov perfect equilibrium.
4.2. Generalization to Dynamic LQG Games. In this subsection, we con-
sider LQG games that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. In order to prove the main result
of the section, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Consider an LQG game G1 that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
Fix a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 2}. If the expected value functions V it , i = 1, 2 of the
controllers at time t + 1 are affine-quadratic functions of mt+1, then the one-stage
Bayesian game at time step t with any mean mt ∈ St is an instance of auxiliary game
AG1.
Proof. Consider a time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1} and a realization ct of the common
information at time step t. Define
X = St =

XtP1t
P2t

 , Yi = Pit, Ui = Uit, i = 1, 2.
The probability measure on the state X is taken to be equal to the common informa-
tion based conditional measure πt(dst) = P {dst|ct}, that admits a Gaussian density
function with mean mt (dependent on ct) and variance Σt, which are defined in
Lemma 2.3. The observation Yi of auxiliary Controller i is the private information
Pit.
We now prove that the one-stage Bayesian game defined above is an instance of
the Auxiliary game AG1. First, note that Yi = HiX for some appropriate matrix
Hi, i ∈ {1, 2}, which implies that the assumption on the covariance matrix of the
auxiliary game given in (4.1) is satisfied by the auxiliary game defined above. We
just need to verify that the cost functions of the controllers of the one-stage Bayesian
game are of the same form as (4.4) and (4.5).
At any time step t ≤ T − 1, let us assume that the expected value function of the
Controller i is V it+1(mt+1) = m
∗
t+1Φ
i
t+1mt+1+Ξ
i
t+1mt+1+Υ
i
t+1 for some appropriate
positive definite matrix Φit+1, matrix Ξ
i
t+1 and a non-negative real number Υ
i
t+1.
Recall from Lemma 2.3 that Mt+1 := F
1
t (mt,Zt+1), where F
1
t is an affine function
of mt and Zt+1. Thus, the cost-to-go for the Controller i ∈ {1, 2} in the one-stage
Bayesian game at time step t < T with mean mt is of the form
ˇˇcit(mt;St,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,Zt+1) := c
i
t(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t ) + (F
1
t (mt,Zt+1))
∗Φit+1F
1
t (mt,Zt+1)
+Ξit+1F
1
t (mt,Zt+1) + Υ
i
t+1. (4.11)
Now, recall the definition of Zt+1 in Assumption 1, and substitute for Y
1
t+1 and Y
2
t+1
in the expression for Zt+1 in terms of Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t and noises using (2.1) and (2.2).
Thus, Zt+1 is an affine map of St, U
1
t , U
2
t and noises W
0
t ,W
1
t+1 and W
2
t+1. Also
recall from Lemma 2.3 that F 1t is an affine map of its arguments. Define c¯
i
t, i = 1, 2
as
c¯it(mt;St,U
1
t ,U
2
t ) = E
[
ˇˇcit(mt;St,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,Zt+1)|St,U
1
t ,U
2
t
]
.
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Thus, the expression for cost function c¯it, i = 1, 2 are precisely of the forms
c¯1t (mt;St,U
1
t ,U
2
t ) =
[
S∗t ,U
1∗
t ,U
2∗
t
]
Ct

StU1t
U2t

+ 2m∗tDt

StU1t
U2t

+ r1tmt + Υ˜1t+1,(4.12)
c¯2t (mt;St,U
1
t ,U
2
t ) =
[
S∗t ,U
1∗
t ,U
2∗
t
]
Et

StU1t
U2t

+ 2m∗tFt

StU1t
U2t

+ r2tmt + Υ˜2t+1, (4.13)
where Ct, Dt, Et, Ft, r
1
t , r
2
t , Υ˜
1
t+1, Υ˜
2
t+1 are dependent on matrices R
i, Φit+1, Ξ
i
t+1 for
i = 1, 2, the linear map F 1t , the variances of noises W
0
t ,W
1
t+1 and W
2
t+1, and the
projection function ζt+1, where ζt+1 is defined in (2.4). The cost functions of the
controllers given above are of the same form as considered in (4.4) and (4.5). Thus,
the one-stage Bayesian game at time t with mean mt is the same as auxiliary game
AG1(mt,Σt, c¯
1
t (mt; ·), c¯
2
t (mt; ·)). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Definition 4.3. For any LQG game G1, the corresponding one-stage Bayesian
game at time step t with mean mt and cost functions of the controllers given by (4.12)
and (4.13) is referred to as AGt(G1;mt). 
Lemma 4.2 implies that the one-stage Bayesian game of the LQG gameG1 at time
t with mean mt is an instance of an auxiliary game AG1(mt,Σt, c¯
1
t (mt; ·), c¯
2
t (mt; ·)),
where c¯it is defined in (4.11). If the matrix tuple (Ct, Et), as defined in (4.12) and
(4.13), satisfies Assumption 3, then for any realization mt, Lemma 4.1 implies that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the one-stage Bayesian game at time step t,
which is affine in the private information of the controllers. Furthermore, the expected
equilibrium costs are affine-quadratic in the mean mt. This crucial observation about
LQG games leads us to the next theorem, which is also the main result of this section.
First, we need the following assumption on the cost functions of the one-stage Bayesian
games of game G1.
Assumption 4. At every time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} of game G1, the matrix
tuple (Ct, Et), as defined in (4.12) and (4.13) and obtained using the procedure outlined
in Algorithm 1 in Subsection 3.7, satisfies Assumption 3. 
The main result of this section is now captured by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Consider an LQG game G1 that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
If Assumption 4 also holds for game G1, then it admits a unique common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium in the class of all Borel measurable strategies of the
controllers. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy of Controller i ∈ {1, 2} is affine in
its information at all time steps.
Proof. We follow the procedure outlined in Algorithm 1 in Subsection 3.7. At
time step T − 1, let mT−1 be a realization of the common information based condi-
tional mean. Consider the one-stage Bayesian gameAGT−1(G1;mT−1) at time T−1.
Since Assumption 4 holds, we use the result of Lemma 4.1 to conclude that a unique
Nash equilibrium policies of the controllers exist. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium
policies of the one-stage Bayesian game AGT−1(G1;mT−1) are affine in the condi-
tional mean and the private information of the controllers at that time step. Since
the conditional mean mT−1 is affine in the common information of the controllers,
we conclude that the Nash equilibrium policies of the controllers in the one-stage
Bayesian game AGT−1(G1;mT−1) is affine in the information of the controllers.
We continue this process for all possible means mt ∈ St at all time steps t ∈
{T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1} to conclude that there is a unique common information based
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Markov perfect equilibrium for game G1.
Remark 3. It should be noted that one can compute the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of game AG1 simply by solving a set of linear equations. In the dynamic
LQG game G1 satisfying the sufficient conditions of Theorem 4.4, the controllers can
just solve a set of linear equations at successive time steps to obtain the unique com-
mon information based Markov perfect equilibrium; thus, computing the equilibrium
is inexpensive in the class of LQG games. 
4.3. LQG Games not satisfying Assumption 4. In this subsection, we show
that even if an LQG game does not satisfy Assumption 4, it may still admit a common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium under some mild conditions. However,
we cannot claim uniqueness of that equilibrium like we did in Theorem 4.4 in the
previous subsection.
Consider the auxiliary game AG1 discussed above. We needed Assumption 3
in two places in the result of Lemma 4.1 above - (i) to conclude the uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium provided that it exists, and (ii) to show the existence of matrices
l1, l2, L1, L2, T 1 and T 2 as defined in (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) above. However, if we drop
this assumption and instead make a milder assumption, then we can obtain a result
that is weaker than what we got above. First, we state the assumption we make to
obtain the weaker result.
Assumption 5. In game AG1, the either (I − C−122 C23E
−1
33 E
∗
23) is invertible or
(I − E−133 E
∗
23C
−1
22 C23) is invertible, and there exists a unique solution to the coupled
pair of equations (4.8) and (4.9). 
If we make this assumption on the auxiliary game AG1, then we can conclude
the following about the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 4.5. If the auxiliary game AG1(m,Σ, c1, c2) satisfies Assumption 5, then
the game admits a Nash equilibrium. The expressions of Nash equilibrium control laws
and expected costs are the same as in Lemma 4.1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.1.
This brings us to the following result for LQG games that may not satisfy As-
sumption 4.
Theorem 4.6. Consider an LQG game G1 that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
For all time steps t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and realizations of the mean mt ∈ St, obtain
the one-stage Bayesian game AGt(G1;mt) by following the steps of Algorithm 1 in
Subsection 3.7. If AGt(G1;mt) satisfies Assumption 5 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
and mt ∈ St, then game G1 admits a common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem
4.4. It should be noticed that for a fixed affine strategy of Controller 1, the one-
person dynamic optimization problem for Controller 2 can be solved using a dynamic
programming (existence follows from Assumption 5) to obtain optimal strategies that
are linear in its information.
Notice that we do not claim uniqueness of the common information based Markov
perfect equilibrium for LQG games that do not satisfy Assumption 4.
4.4. An Illustrative Example. In this section, we consider an example of a
two-player non-zero sum game considered above. There are three states in the game,
out of which one is a global state that is observed by both controllers, and two states
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are local states of the controllers. The state evolution is given by
X0t+1 = AX
0
t +B
1U1t +B
2U2t +W
0
t ,
Xit+1 = A
iX0t +D
i
1U
1
t +D
i
2U
2
t +W
i
t, i = 1, 2,
where X0t is the global state and X
i
t, i = 1, 2 are the local states for t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
The noise processes Wit are assumed to be mutually independent mean-zero Gaussian
random variables with variances Λit for i = 0, 1, 2 and t = 1, . . . , T − 1. Player i’s
information Iit lies in a Euclidean space, that is I
i
t = X
0
1:t × X
i
1:t × U
1:2
1:t−1. The cost
functions of the players are given by
ciT (x
0
T ,x
i
T ) = x
0∗
T Q
ix0T + x
i∗
T Q
ixiT ,
cit(x
0
t ,x
i
t,u
1:2
t ) = x
0∗
t Q
ix0t + x
i∗
t Q
ixit + u
1∗
t R
iu1t + u
2∗
t S
iu2t , i = 1, 2.
We first verify in the following lemma that both assumptions on the information
structure is satisfied by this game. Toward this end, recall that the space of common
information of the players is Ct := X 01:t × U
1:2
1:t−1 and the space of private information
of Player i is P it := X
i
1:t.
Lemma 4.7. The information structure of the controllers in the game defined
above satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proof. Since the information structure is nested, Assumption 1 is automatically
satisfied. Given the common information ct, it is easy to verify that the joint distri-
bution of private informations of the players are Gaussian and independent of past
strategies of the players since Wit are mutually independent Gaussian random vari-
ables for all time steps, and i = 1, 2. This implies that Assumption 2 is also satisfied.
We are interested in computing common information based Markov perfect equi-
librium of this game. At a time step t, since the private state of both controllers are
affected by the global state at time step t − 1 but not the private states at the pre-
vious time steps, the past realizations of private states of Controller i, xi1, . . . ,x
i
t−1,
do not affect the common information based Markov perfect equilibrium. There-
fore, for ease of exposition, we make minor changes in the notations from what we
have used in previous sections. Let us denote the mean of the random variable Xit
given the common information Ct as M
i
t, i = 1, 2. Note that the mean is given
by Mit = A
iX0t−1 + D
i
1U
1
t−1 + D
i
2U
2
t−1. The variance of X
i
t given the common in-
formation Ct is Λ
i
t. Define Mt := [X
0∗
t ,M
1∗
t ,M
2∗
t ]
∗ to be the conditional mean
of the states [X0∗t ,X
1∗
t ,X
2∗
t ]
∗ given the common information Ct. Also note that
Zt+1 = [U
1∗
t ,U
2∗
t ,X
0∗
t+1]
∗. The evolution of Mt is given by
Mt+1 =

 X0t+1A1X0t +D11U1t +D12U2t
A2X0t +D
2
1U
1
t +D
2
2U
2
t


=: F 1t (X
0
t ,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,X
0
t+1). (4.14)
The conditional covariance matrix is Σt+1 := diag{0,Λ1t+1,Λ
2
t+1}. Let us assume that
this game satisfies Assumption 4. By Theorem 4.4, we conclude that this game admits
a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium. Now, we compute
the unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of this game.
1. At the terminal time T , for each realization m := [x0∗T ,m
1∗,m2∗]∗ of MT ,
the one-stage Bayesian game SGT (m) is defined as follows
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(a) The conditional probability distribution on X 0T ×X
1
T×X
2
T given the com-
mon information cT is a Gaussian density with mean m and covariance
ΣT .
(b) Player i observes X0T ,X
i
T , i = 1, 2. No action is chosen.
(c) Player i’s cost is ciT (x
0
T ,x
i
T ).
The expected costs as functions of beliefs are of the form V iT (m) = x
0∗
T Q
ix0T+
mi∗Qimi + trace(QiΛiT ).
2. At time t < T , for each realization m of Mt, we define a one-stage Bayesian
game SGt(m) where
(a) The probability distribution on X 0t ×X
1
t ×X
2
t is a Gaussian density with
mean m and covariance Σt.
(b) Player i observes X0t ,X
i
t and chooses action U
i
t, i = 1, 2.
(c) The cost of the subgame SGt(m) accrued by Player i is
cit(x
0
t ,x
i
t,u
1:2
t ) + E
[
V it+1(F
1
t (x
0
t ,u
1
t ,u
2
t ,X
0
t+1))
]
,
where F 1t is defined in (4.14). If we expand this cost function and write
it in terms of x0t ,u
1
t , u
2
t and noise variables, then we observe that the
resulting cost function is of the same form as in the auxiliary game
AG1 considered in Subsection 4.1 above. The Nash equilibrium of the
Bayesian game SGt(m) is computed using the result in Lemma 4.1.
The value functions of the virtual players are of the form V it (m) =
x0∗t Φ
i
tx
0
t + m
i∗Ξitm
i + Υit, where Φ
i
t and Ξ
i
t are non-negative definite
matrices and Υit is a non-negative real number.
Thus, we computed the unique common information based Markov perfect
equilibrium of the game.
In the next section, we show that there could be several other Nash equilibria of game
G1.
5. A Game with Multiple Nash Equilibria. In previous sections, we out-
lined an algorithm that can be used to compute Nash equilibria of games that satisfy
Assumptions 1 and 2. In this section, we exhibit an example of a game of asymmet-
ric information that has several Nash equilibria and a unique common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium. This reinforces Remark 1 stated after Theorem
3.8, which points out that our algorithm computes only a subclass of those Nash equi-
libria that can be obtained using the Markov perfect equilibrium of the corresponding
symmetric information game between the virtual players.
To illustrate the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, we follow the lines in Exam-
ple 1 of [13, p. 241], and consider the following two-stage game in which all variables
are scalar:
x2 = x1 + u
1
1 + u
2
1 + w
0
1 , y
1
1 = x1 + w
1
1 , y
2
1 = x1 + w
2
1 ,
x3 = x2 + u
2
2 + w
0
2 , y
2
2 = x2 + w
2
2 .
The primitive random variables {X1,W
0
1 ,W
0
2 ,W
1
1 ,W
2
1 ,W
2
2 } are all mutually inde-
pendent, mean zero Gaussian random variables with unit variance. The information
structure of Controller 1 is I11 = Y
1
1 and I
1
2 = [U
1
1 , U
2
1 , Y
1
1 , Y
2
1 ]
∗, and the information
structure of Controller 2 is I21 = Y
2
1 and I
2
2 = [Y
2
2 , U
1
1 , U
2
1 , Y
1
1 , Y
2
1 ]
∗. Since the infor-
mation structure is of the one-step delayed sharing pattern type, this game satisfies
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Assumptions 1 and 2. The cost functions of the controllers are
J1(g11 , g
2
1 , g
2
2) = E
[
(X3)
2 + (U11 )
2
]
,
J2(g11 , g
2
1 , g
2
2) = E
[
(X3)
2 + (U21 )
2 + (U22 )
2
]
.
The Kalman filter equations for evolution of common information based belief are
given by
m02 = E [X2|c2] =
y11 + y
2
1
3
+ u11 + u
2
1, Σ
0
2 = E
[
(X2 −m
0
2)
2
]
=
4
3
.
Now, we compute the common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of this
game.
5.1. Common Information based Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Recall
that since this is an LQG game, there exists a unique common information based
Markov perfect equilibrium. We now apply our algorithm to compute the common
information based Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. In the sub-game starting
at time step t = 2, Controller 2 is the only player acting and the cost-to-go function
for the sub-game starting at t = 2 is strictly convex in the control action of Controller
2. The unique optimal control law for Controller 2 for the sub-game at t = 2, given
its information, is given by
g2⋆2 (i
2
2) = −
1
2
E
[
X2|i
2
2
]
= −
1
2
E
[
X2|m
0
2, y
2
2
]
= −
1
2
(
m02 +
4
7
(y22 −m
0
2)
)
. (5.1)
The expected value functions of the controllers at time step 2 are
V 12 (m
0
2) =
1
4
(m02)
2 +
37
21
, V 22 (m
0
2) =
1
2
(m02)
2 +
41
21
.
Now, using the result of Lemma 4.1, we obtain the unique Nash equilibrium of the
sub-game starting at the first time step to be
g1⋆1 (y
1
1) = −
5
59
y11 , g
2⋆
1 (y
2
1) = −
9
59
y21 . (5.2)
Thus, this game has a unique common information based Markov perfect equilibrium
(g1⋆1 , (g
2⋆
1 , g
2⋆
2 )). In the next subsection, we show that there exists a continuum of Nash
equilibria in this game, and those equilibria cannot be obtained using our approach.
5.2. Other Nash Equilibria. In this subsection, we show that if Controller 2
uses the common information (instead of only mean m02) to construct its control law
at time step t = 2, then we have a continuum of Nash equilibrium in this game.
We now define a tuple of strategies (g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) ∈ G
1
1×G
2
1:2 of both controllers,
parametrized by a real number λ 6= −59/22:
g1†1 (y
1
1) = −
10λ+ 5
22λ+ 59
y11 , g
2†
1 (y
2
1) = −
2λ+ 9
22λ+ 59
y21 ,
g2†2 (i
2
2) = −
1
2
(
m02 +
4
7
(y22 −m
0
2)
)
+ λ
(
u11 − g
1†
1 (y
1
1)
)
. (5.3)
We now have the following result:
Lemma 5.1. The strategy profile (g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) is a Nash equilibrium of the
game formulated above for any value of λ 6= −59/22.
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Proof. We prove that for a fixed strategy g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 ) is the best response
strategy of Controller 2 and vice versa.
First, fix u11 = g
1†
1 (y
1
1). Then, g
2†
2 minimizes the cost E
[
(X3)
2
∣∣u11 = g1†1 (y11), i22]
(note that i22 contains y
1
1). One can then verify that g
2†
1 minimizes the cost functional
J2(g1†1 , (g
2
1 , g
2†
2 )). Therefore, we conclude that J
2(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) ≤ J
2(g1†1 , (g
2
1 , g
2
2))
for any g2 := (g21 , g
2
2) ∈ G
2
1:2.
Next, fix u21 = g
2†
1 (y
2
1), u
2
2 = g
2†
2 (i
2
2). Then, the cost-to-go function for Controller
1 is at time step 1 for the fixed strategy of Controller 2 is
1
4
(m02)
2 +
37
21
+ λm02(u
1
1 − g
1†
1 (y
1
1)) + λ
2
(
u11 − g
1†
1 (y
1
1)
)2
.
The control law g1†1 minimizes the cost functional of Controller 1 at time step t = 1.
Thus, we conclude J1(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) ≤ J
1(g11 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) for any g
1
1 ∈ G
1
1 .
Thus, we have proved that, in fact, there are several Nash equilibria of this game,
and the Nash equilibrium obtained using our algorithm is just one among them (notice
that the common information based Markov perfect equilibrium corresponds to the
choice of λ = 0).
Remark 4. It has been shown in [12] that if the control actions are not shared
among the controllers, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game for-
mulated above. The unique Nash equilibrium is the same set of control laws given in
(5.1) and (5.2) with ui1 substituted with g
i⋆
1 (y
i
1) in the expression of m
0
2. Thus, the
existence of multiple Nash equilibria in this game is due to the information available
to Controller 2 at time step 2 about the action taken by the Controller 1 at time step
1. This example illustrates that more information to controllers may be harmful in a
game as it gives rise to several other Nash equilibria! 
Remark 5. It should also be noted that in case control actions are not shared,
Assumption 2 does not hold. However, [12] proved that an LQG game with one-step
delayed observation sharing pattern admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Thus, Nash
equilibrium in a dynamic game of asymmetric information may exist even in the
absence of Assumption 2 on that game. 
5.3. Effects on Expected Costs. We now compare the expected costs to the
controllers, if the Controller 2 plays according to a Nash equilibrium given by (5.3).
First, note that E
[
(Y i1 )
2
]
= 2, i = 1, 2 and E
[
Y 11 Y
2
1
]
= 1. This implies
(m02)
2 =
2
9(22λ+ 59)2
(
(−8λ+ 44)2 + (16λ+ 32)2 + (−8λ+ 44)(16λ+ 32)
)
.
The expected costs to the controllers at Nash equilibrium (g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) are given by
J1†(λ) := J1(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) =
1
4
(m02)
2 +
2(10λ+ 5)2
(22λ+ 59)2
+
37
21
,
J2†(λ) := J2(g1†1 , (g
2†
1 , g
2†
2 )) =
1
2
(m02)
2 +
2(2λ+ 9)2
(22λ+ 59)2
+
41
21
.
If we take the limit λ→∞, we get
lim
λ→∞
J1†(λ) =
200 + 323
484
+
37
21
≈ 2.197, lim
λ→∞
J2†(λ) =
8 + 643
484
+
41
21
≈ 2.013.
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On the other hand, J1†(0) ≈ 1.832 and J2†(0) ≈ 2.092, which corresponds to the
expected costs to the controllers if they play according to the common information
based Markov perfect equilibrium. Clearly, Controller 2, by choosing an appropriate
(very large) value of λ, can reduce its expected cost, while increasing the expected cost
to Controller 1; this observation has connections to incentive designs where Controller
2 can be viewed as the designer (leader) in the game.
6. Discussion. One of the crucial assumptions we made in the game formulation
is the strategy independence of beliefs in Assumption 2. As discussed in our companion
paper [15], this assumption plays a crucial role in computing the Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium of game G2 using a backward induction dynamic programming. In this
section, we briefly describe the reason why this assumption is important. For a more
detailed and technical discussion, we refer the reader to [15].
Recall that as a consequence of Assumption 1, we have
Πt+1 = Ft(Πt,Γ
1
t ,Γ
2
t ,Zt+1).
Suppose Assumption 2 does not hold for some gameG1, and the common information
based conditional belief is dependent on the strategy of Controller 1 at some time
step t0. At any time step t ≥ t0, in order for Controller 2 to know the belief Πt
exactly, the virtual player 1 needs to share its prescriptions in game G2. If virtual
player 1 does not share its prescription, then virtual player 2 needs to know the
precise strategy of virtual player 1. Now, if the virtual players neither share their
prescriptions nor their strategies, then each controller has an incentive to deviate
from the Nash equilibrium to reap the benefit of asymmetry in the beliefs caused by
changing its strategy. In other words, each controller has an incentive to “deceive”
the other controller if Assumption 2 does not hold. Assumption 2 assumes that the
common information is “rich enough” so that controllers cannot deceive each other.
In case the cost functions of the controllers are aligned (that is, they are same at
all time steps), then the game problem is just a team problem, and Assumption 2 is
not required. In team problems, the agents can agree, prior to the start of the play,
on what strategies they will use during the course of the play. Moreover, since the
cost functions of all the agents are aligned, no agent has an incentive to deviate from
the pre-agreed strategies. Consequently, we need not make Assumption 2.
We now consider the case when the cost functions have opposite signs in game
G1, that is c1t = −c
2
t for all time steps t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. This makes game G1 as
a zero-sum game with asymmetric information among the controllers. In this case,
if a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium exists, then due to the
ordered-interchangeability property of multiple saddle-point equilibria of zero-sum
games [8], the expected costs to the controllers remain the same for all other saddle-
point equilibrium strategies of the game. Thus, our backward induction algorithm
in Theorem 3.8 provides a constructive method to compute saddle-point equilibrium
in a zero-sum game of asymmetric information among the controllers, provided that
such an equilibrium exists.
7. Conclusion and Future Work. We studied dynamic two-player linear-
Gaussian non-zero sum games in this paper, where the controllers have asymmetric
information and their information structures satisfy two assumptions. We showed
that under certain structural assumptions on the admissible strategies and stagewise
additive cost functions of the players, the existence of a common information based
Markov perfect equilibrium can be established by proving the existence of Nash equi-
librium in a sequence of static games of symmetric information. For LQG games with
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cost functions satisfying certain assumptions, we showed that there exists a unique
common information based Markov perfect equilibrium. We also gave analytical ex-
pressions for the common information based Markov perfect equilibrium for a class of
LQG games.
The main idea consisted of defining a new game of symmetric information and
perfect observations among virtual players, computing the Markov perfect equilibrium
of that game, and then using the Markov perfect equilibrium strategies to obtain a
Nash equilibrium of the original game of asymmetric information. We also developed a
backward induction algorithm that computes the common information based Markov
perfect equilibrium of the game, as long as a Nash equilibrium exists in the static
symmetric information game between the virtual players at every time step in the
backward induction algorithm. This conceptual approach can be extended to non-
zero sum dynamic stochastic games with a finite number of players, which satisfy
the two assumptions on the information structures and the assumptions on the cost
functions and admissible strategies.
We showed that there may be other Nash equilibria in games, which however
cannot be computed using the common information based approach. This is due to
the fact that Markov perfect equilibria of the corresponding symmetric and perfect
information game among virtual players is a small subclass of Nash equilibria of
that game. The conceptual framework we developed in this paper can be used to
compute the Nash equilibrium of several classes of games of asymmetric information
with infinite and uncountable state and action spaces.
The case of multi-player LQG games can also be solved along similar lines using
the result of [13]. What still remains to be investigated is the value of information
in games with asymmetric information. This is a challenging problem, because as we
showed in Section 5, extra information given to one player generates several other
Nash equilibria in the game. It will be interesting to identify a refinement concept for
several Nash equilibria arising out of asymmetry in information or extra information
to one player.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let ct be the realized common information
at time step t. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let γit be such that g
i
t(p
i
t, ct) = γ
i
t(p
i
t) for all realizations
of pit ∈ P
i
t . Let πt(dst) = P{dst|ct}. Recall maps ξ
i
t+1, i = 1, 2 and ζt+1 from
Assumption 1. Let St+1 ⊂ St+1 and Zt+1 ⊂ Zt+1 be Borel sets. Now, notice that
P {St+1 × Zt+1|ct}
=
∫
St+1×Zt+1×U1:2t ×Y
1:2
t ×St
P
{
dst+1, dzt+1, du
1:2
t , dy
1:2
t , dst|ct
}
=
∫
St+1×Zt+1×U1:2t ×Y
1:2
t ×St
1{ζt+1(p1t ,p
2
t ,u
1
t ,u
2
t ,y
1
t+1
,y2
t+1
)}(dzt+1)
1{ξ1
t+1
(p1t ,u
1
t ,y
1
t+1
)}(dp
1
t+1)1{ξ2t+1(p2t ,u2t ,y2t+1)}(dp
2
t+1)1{γ1t (p1t )}(du
1
t )
1{γ2t (p
2
t )}
(du2t )P{dy
1
t+1, dy
2
t+1|xt+1}P{dxt+1|xt,u
1
t ,u
2
t}πt(dxt, dp
1
t , dp
2
t ).
It should be noted that the right side of the expression above depends only on πt
and the choice of prescription pair (γ1t , γ
2
t ). Therefore, if the conditional probabil-
ity measure P {St+1 × Zt+1|ct} is disintegrated with respect to the random variable
zt+1, then we get that πt+1(dst+1) := P {dst+1|ct, zt+1} depends on πt, the choice of
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prescription pair (γ1t , γ
2
t ) and the realization of the random variable zt+1. It should
be noted that the measure update equation is a combination of integral equation and
a disintegration of probability measure, which does not depend on the choice of the
strategy pair (g1,g2). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2.2. The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1: At the first time step, since X1,W
0:2
1 are mutually independent Gaussian
random variables and observations are affine functions of the state, we conclude that
the joint measure P {ds1|c1} admits a distribution with Gaussian density function.
Step 2: For time steps t ≥ 2, assume that all control laws used till that time
are affine functions of common and private information. Moreover, since all noise
variables have full support, every possible value of common information ct in Ct can
be realized with the choice of affine control laws of the controllers. With affine control
laws, the state, the private information and the common information random variables
are jointly Gaussian and hence the conditional distribution on the state and private
information given ct admits a Gaussian density for every ct ∈ Ct.
Step 3: Assumption 2 states that the common information based conditional
measure πt does not depend on the choice of control laws. Therefore, under any
choice of control laws, the conditional probability measure on the state and the private
information given ct must admit a Gaussian density for every possible realization
ct ∈ Ct.
Thus, for any strategy profile of the controllers, the conditional measure πt admits
a Gaussian density at all time steps t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. This completes the proof of
the lemma.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 2.3. Since any Gaussian distribution is char-
acterized by its mean and covariance, from (2.6), we know that
(Mt+1,Σt+1) = Ft((Mt,Σt),Zt+1). (C.1)
To establish the result, we need to prove that Σt does not depend on the realizations
of the random variable Ct, and F
1
t is affine.
We first show that Σt does not depend on the realizations of the random variable
Ct. Assume that the control laws of both controllers at all time steps are affine in
their information at that time step. Due to linearity of system dynamics and the
observation equations, the state, private informations and the common information
are jointly Gaussian. Recall that if (X,Y) are jointly Gaussian random variables,
then the conditional measure on X given y, denoted by P {dx|y}, admits a Gaussian
density function with conditional covariance matrix independent of the realization y.
As a consequence of this result, we get that conditional measure on St = Xt×P1t ×P
2
t
given the common information ct is a Gaussian distribution with the conditional
covariance matrix independent of the realization of the common information. Thus,
the covariance matrix Σt evolves according to (2.8).
Now, notice that E [St|ct] is an affine function of ct. Therefore, Mt+1 is an affine
function of Ct+1 and Mt is an affine function of Ct. Combining this with (C.1), we
conclude that Mt+1 is an affine function of Mt and Zt+1. Thus, for any time step
t, F 1t is an affine function of its arguments, and Mt evolves according to (2.7). This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 3.2.
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We use nested expectation to prove this result. Let Γit = χ
i
t(Ct). This gives us
E
[
cit(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t )
]
= E
[
E
[
cit(Xt,U
1
t ,U
2
t )
∣∣∣Ct] ]
= E
[
E
[
cit(Xt,Γ
1
t (P
1
t ),Γ
2
t (P
2
t ))
∣∣∣Ct] ],
= E
[
c˜it(Mt, χ
1
t (Ct), χ
2
t (Ct))
]
,
where the first equality follows from the property of expectation, the second equality
merely substitutes Uit = Γ
i
t(P
i
t), and the third equality follows from the definition of
c˜it. The above equalities, together with Assumption 1 (the common information Ct
always increases at all time steps t), lead us to the following equalities
J i(g1, g2) = E
[
E
[
. . .E
[
E
[
ciT (XT )
+ciT−1(XT−1, g
1
T−1(P
1
T−1,CT−1), g
2
T−1(P
2
T−1,CT−1))
∣∣∣∣CT−1
]
+ciT−2(XT−2, g
1
T−2(P
1
T−2,CT−2), g
2
T−2(P
2
T−2,CT−2))
∣∣∣∣CT−2
]
. . .
∣∣∣∣C1
]]
,
= E
[
E
[
. . .E
[
E
[
c˜iT (MT )
+c˜iT−1(MT−1, χ
1
T−1(CT−1), χ
2
T−1(CT−1))
∣∣∣∣CT−1
]
+c˜iT−2(MT−2, χ
1
T−2(CT−2), χ
2
T−2(CT−2))
∣∣∣∣CT−2
]
. . .
∣∣∣∣C1
]]
,
= J˜ i(χ1, χ2).
This completes the proof of the lemma. The converse can also be proved using similar
arguments.
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 3.3. Consider a realization of common infor-
mation ct and realizations (m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t ) of means and prescriptions until time step t.
From (2.7) in Lemma 2.3, we have Mt+1 = F
1
t (mt,Zt+1). As a consequence of this
equation, it is sufficient to prove that
P{Zt+1|ct,m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t } = P{Zt+1|mt, γ
1:2
t } for all Borel sets Zt+1 ⊂ Zt+1.
Consider an arbitrary Borel set Zt+1 ⊂ Zt+1. From Assumption 1, we get
Zt+1 = ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t ,U
1
t ,U
2
t ,Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1)
= ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t , γ
1
t (P
1
t ), γ
2
t (P
2
t ),Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1),
where we used the fact that the players used the strategies prescribed by the virtual
players. Define Ot := P1t × P
2
t × Y
1
t+1 × Y
2
t+1 and
ζ˜t+1(Ot, γ
1
t , γ
2
t ) := ζt+1(P
1
t ,P
2
t , γ
1
t (P
1
t ), γ
2
t (P
2
t ),Y
1
t+1,Y
2
t+1),
where Ot ∈ Ot. Let N(·; Σ) denote the density function of a multi-variate mean-zero
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Gaussian random vector with variance Σ. Now notice the following:
P{Zt+1 ∈ Zt+1|ct,m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t }
=
∫
Zt+1
∫
Xt×Xt+1×Ot
P{dzt+1, dxt, dxt+1, dot|ct,m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t }
=
∫
Zt+1
∫
Xt×Xt+1×Ot
1{ζ˜t+1(ot,γ1t ,γ
2
t )}
(dzt+1)P{dy
1:2
t+1|xt+1}
P{dxt+1|xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t )}P{dxt, dp
1
t , dp
2
t |ct,m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t },
=
∫
Zt+1
∫
Xt×Xt+1×Ot
1{ζ˜t+1(ot,γ1t ,γ
2
t )}
(dzt+1)P{dy
1:2
t+1|xt+1}
P{dxt+1|xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t )}N(st −mt; Σt)dst,
where we used the fact that the conditional distribution P{dxt, dp
1
t , dp
2
t |ct,m1:t, γ
1:2
1:t }
is a Gaussian distribution with meanmt and variance Σt (recall that Σt is independent
of the realizations of random variables by Lemma 2.3). The right side of the equation
above depends only on mt and the choice of prescriptions γ
1:2
t . This establishes the
result of the lemma.
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let (χ1⋆, χ2⋆) be a Nash equilibrium
strategy profile of game G2. We want to show that the strategy profile (g1⋆,g2⋆) is
a Nash equilibrium of game G1. Let g1 ∈ G11:T−1 be an arbitrary strategy of Player
1. Define χ1 := ς1(g1). From the definition of Nash equilibrium of game G2, we get
J1(g1⋆,g2⋆) = J˜1(χ1⋆, χ2⋆) ≤ J˜1(χ1, χ2⋆) = J1(g1,g2⋆),
where we used the result of Lemma 3.2. Similarly, we get J2(g1⋆,g2⋆) ≤ J2(g1⋆,g2)
for all g2 ∈ G21:T−1. Thus, strategy profile (g
1⋆,g2⋆) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of
game G1.
Using similar steps as above, we prove the converse. This establishes the result
of the theorem.
Appendix G. Proof of Lemma 3.5. Assume that virtual player 2 uses a fixed
strategy of the form Γ2t = ψ
2
t (Mt), t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. We show that the virtual player 1’s
problem is simply a Markov decision problem with state process {Mt}t∈{1,...,T} and
actions {Γ1t}t∈{1,...,T−1}.
Suppose at time t, ct is the realization of the common information, mt is the
realization of the mean of the conditional measure πt, γ
2
t := ψ
2
t (mt), and virtual player
1 selects γ1t as its action. Recall that P{dxt, dp
1
t , dp
2
t |ct} is a Gaussian distribution
with mean mt and variance Σt. The expected instantaneous cost is
c˜1t (mt, γ
1
t , ψ
2
t (mt)) = E
[
c1t (Xt, γ
1
t (P
1
t ), γ
2
t (P
2
t ))|ct
]
=
∫
St
c1t (xt, γ
1
t (p
1
t ), γ
2
t (p
2
t ))P{dst|ct}.
Since P{dst|ct} and γ
2
t are functions of mt at all time steps t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, we
conclude that the cost of virtual player 1 at time step t is only a function ofmt and γ
1
t .
Also recall that in Lemma 3.3, we proved that {Mt}t∈{1,...,T} is a controlled Markov
chain. Therefore, virtual player 1’s optimization is a Markov decision problem with
Mt as the state and γ
1
t as the controlling action. The corresponding statement for
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virtual player 2 can also be proved using similar arguments. This completes the proof
of the lemma.
Appendix H. Proof of Theorem 3.8. Suppose that the strategy profile
(ψ1⋆, ψ2⋆) of virtual players is a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2. Fix a
time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and a virtual player i ∈ {1, 2}. By definition of Markov
perfect equilibrium, we know that ψi⋆t:T−1 minimizes the expected cost
E
[
c˜iT (MT ) +
T−1∑
s=t
c˜is(Ms, γ
i
s, ψ
−i⋆
s (Ms))
]
.
Applying the principle of dynamic programming, we can easily verify that (3.4) is
satisfied by the control law ψi⋆t .
We now prove the converse. For a fixed sub-game strategy ψjt:T−1 of virtual player
j, let us denote the one-sided optimization problem for virtual player i 6= j at time
instant t given the Markov state mt by MDP
i
t (ψ
j
t:T−1,mt). We prove the converse
of the statement of the theorem by showing that the strategy pair (ψ1⋆t:T−1, ψ
2⋆
t:T−1)
as defined by (3.4) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium for every sub-game starting at
time instant t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}.
Fix the strategy profile of virtual player 2 to ψ2⋆ = {ψ2⋆1 , . . . , ψ
2⋆
T−1} and fix any
time step t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. Then, using the principle of dynamic programming for
Markov decision processes, the recursion in (3.2) and (3.3) implies that ψ1⋆t:T−1 is the
optimal strategy of virtual player 1 for MDP 1t (ψ
2⋆
t:T−1,mt). Since the time step t
was arbitrary, we conclude that ψ1⋆ is the best response strategy of virtual player 1.
A similar argument proves that ψ2⋆ is the best response strategy of virtual player 2
given the virtual player 1’s strategy ψ1⋆. This completes the proof of the converse
part of the theorem.
Appendix I. Proof of Lemma 4.1. We first need several results about eigen-
values, eigenvectors, and pseudo-inverses of symmetric non-invertible matrices. We
turn our attention to the proof of Lemma 4.1 thereafter.
Lemma I.1. In the statements below, for any square matrix D ∈ Rn×n, D−1
denotes generalized inverse of the matrix.
1. For any square matrix D ∈ Rn×n, DD−1D = D.
2. Let D1 and D2 be matrices of appropriate dimensions. Then, the sets of
non-zero eigenvalues of D1D2 and D2D1 are the same.
3. Any symmetric matrix D ∈ Rn×n has real eigenvalues and a mutually orthog-
onal set of eigenvectors that spans Rn. Thus, spectral radius of D∗D = D2
is the same as the square of the spectral radius of D.
4. For any matrix D ∈ Rm×n, the matrix D∗(DD∗)−1D is a symmetric positive
semi-definite matrix with every non-zero eigenvalue of the matrix equal to 1.
5. Let D1, D2 be matrices of appropriate dimensions. Define a square matrix D
as
D := (D1D
∗
1)
−1D1D
∗
2(D2D
∗
2)
−1D2D
∗
1 .
Then, all eigenvalues of D are non-negative real numbers that are less than
or equal to 1.
Proof.
1. See [27, Theorem 4.3.2, p. 100]
2. See [28, p. 24].
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3. Since D is symmetric, it is normal, that is, it is diagonalizable via a similarity
transformation [28, 4.10.3, p. 67]. From [28, 4.10.3, p. 67], we also know that
the set of eigenvectors of a symmetric matrix in Rn×n forms an orthonormal
basis for Rn (for a proof, see [29, Theorem 2, p. 54]).
4. The fact that D∗(DD∗)−1D is symmetric is clear. We first prove that
D∗(DD∗)−1D is positive semi-definite. Since DD∗ is positive semi-definite,
(DD∗)−1 is positive semi-definite by [28, Theorem 4.4.3, p. 109]. Thus,
D∗(DD∗)−1D is positive semi-definite, and therefore, its eigenvalues are
non-negative real numbers. Using Part 2, we know that D∗(DD∗)−1D and
(DD∗)−1DD∗ have the same set of non-zero eigenvalues. Now, let λ be a
non-zero eigenvalue of (DD∗)−1DD∗ and e be the corresponding eigenvec-
tor. Then,
(DD∗)−1DD∗e = λe.
From the above equation, we note that e cannot lie in the nullspace of D∗
as λ 6= 0, which further implies that e∗DD∗e > 0. Multiplying both sides in
the above equation by e∗DD∗ and using the identity in Part 1, we get
e∗DD∗(DD∗)−1DD∗e = e∗DD∗e = λe∗DD∗e.
Thus, λ = 1. This completes the proof of this part of the lemma.
5. Let Pi := D
∗
i (DiD
∗
i )
−1Di for i = 1, 2. Note that P1 and P2 are symmetric
positive semi-definite matrices and have the same dimension. Part 2 of the
lemma implies that D and P1P2 have the same set of non-zero eigenvalues.
Part 4 of the lemma implies that spectral radius of Pi is equal to 1 for i = 1, 2.
Part 3 implies P ∗i Pi has spectral radius 1 for i = 1, 2. Let λ be a non-zero
eigenvalue of P1P2 and e be the corresponding normalized eigenvector. Then,
we have P1P2e = λe. Taking the usual norm on both sides of the equation,
we get
|λ|2e∗e = (P2e)
∗P ∗1 P1(P2e) ≤ e
∗P ∗2 P2e ≤ e
∗e.
Thus, |λ| ≤ 1, which completes the proof of this part of the lemma.
Lemma I.2. Let λ(·) denote the spectral radius of a matrix (·). Let P1, P2 and P3
be square matrices in Rn×n. If λ(P1)λ(P2) < 1, then there exists a unique D ∈ Rn×n
such that D + P1DP2 = P3 is satisfied.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 3 in [11].
We now prove Lemma 4.1 in three steps. First, we consider another game AG2
with a different cost function and show that games AG1 and AG2 have the same set
of Nash equilibria. The cost functions of the players in game AG2 have a form that
is similar to the game considered in [11]. However, in [11], the matrices Σyiyi , i = 1, 2
are assumed to be invertible, which we relax in this proof. In Step 2 of the proof, we
use the result from [11–13] to show that the Nash equilibrium of game AG2 exists
and is affine in the information of the players. Then, we use the Step 1 of the proof
to obtain the Nash equilibrium of game AG1.
Step 1: Consider gameAG2 in which the players have the following cost functions
c¯1(X,U1,U2) = U1∗C22U
1 + 2U1∗C∗12X+ 2U
1∗C23U
2 + 2d2U
1, (I.1)
c¯2(X,U1,U2) = U2∗E33U
2 + 2U2∗E∗13X+ 2U
2∗E∗23U
1 + 2f3U
2. (I.2)
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The difference in AG1 and AG2 lies in the cost functions of the players. In game
AG1, cost ci has the terms that are not dependent on Ui for i = 1, 2 whereas in game
AG2, cost c¯i has only the terms dependent on Ui for i = 1, 2. Thus, games AG1 and
AG2 are strategically equivalent.
Step 2: In this step, we prove that game AG2 has a unique Nash equilibrium
that is affine in the information of the controllers. From [13, Theorem 1, p. 236], we
know that if Assumption 3 holds, then the Nash equilibrium strategy tuple of game
AG2 exists, is unique and affine in its argument. Assume that the Nash equilibrium
strategies are given by
gi⋆(Yi) = T i(Yi −myi) + b
i, i = 1, 2.
Then, b1, b2 must be the solutions of the following pair of equations
b1 = −C−122 [d
∗
2 + C12mx + C23b
2]
b2 = −E−133 [f
∗
3 + E13mx + E
∗
23b
1],
and T 1, T 2 must be the solutions of the following pair of equations
T 1 = −C−122 [C
∗
12Σxy1Σ
−1
y1y1
+ C23T
2Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1
],
T 2 = −E−133 [E
∗
13Σxy2Σ
−1
y2y2
+ E∗23T
1Σy1y2Σ
−1
y2y2
].
We now show that there exist pairs (b1, b2) and (T 1, T 2) which satisfy the above
set of equations. If Σyiyi , i = 1, 2 are invertible, then the existence of such pairs
(b1, b2) and (T 1, T 2) follow from [11]. We now prove that such pairs exist even if
Σyiyi , i = 1, 2 are not invertible. In what follows, Σ
−1
yiyi
represents the generalized
inverse of Σyiyi , i = 1, 2.
Since Assumption 3 holds, there exists an i0 ∈ {1, 2} and a matrix K ∈ Ki0 such
that λ¯(K) < 1. Without loss of generality, assume that i0 = 1 and let L be the matrix
such that K = LK1L
−1. Let b˜1 = Lb1, b˜2 = Lb2, T˜ 1 = LT 1 and T˜ 2 = LT 2. Now,
notice that
b˜1 = −LC−122 [d
∗
2 + C12mx + C23L
−1b˜2]
b˜2 = −LE−133 [f
∗
3 + E13mx + E
∗
23L
−1b˜1],
which admits a unique solution since λ¯(K) < 1. This further implies that a pair of
(b1, b2) exists. We now prove that there exist T 1 and T 2 satisfying the above pair of
equations. Substituting the expression for T 2 in the expression of T 1 and writing the
expression in terms of T˜ 1, we get
T˜ 1 = −LC−122 C
∗
12Σxy1Σ
−1
y1y1
+ LC−122 C23E
−1
33 E
∗
13Σxy2Σ
−1
y2y2
+L(C−122 C23E
−1
33 E
∗
23)L
−1T˜ 1(Σy1y2Σ
−1
y2y2
Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1
), (I.3)
where L(C−122 C23E
−1
33 E
∗
23)L
−1 is equal to K. Also note that by Lemma A2 in [11,
p. 327], λ¯(K) < 1 implies λ(K) < 1. Now, recall that Σyiyj = Σ
1
2
yiyi
Σ
1
2
∗
yjyj
for
i, j = 1, 2. Thus, Lemma I.1 Part 5 implies that λ(Σy1y2Σ
−1
y2y2
Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1
) ≤ 1. Since
λ(K)λ(Σy1y2Σ
−1
y2y2
Σy2y1Σ
−1
y1y1
) < 1, we conclude from Lemma I.2 that there exists a
unique T˜ 1, which satisfies (I.3). This further implies the existence of a unique T 1
in (4.8)-(4.9). We can substitute this value of T 1 in the expression for T 2 to get its
unique value.
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The case of i0 = 2 is analogous to the argument as above. We first get a unique
value of T 2 and then substitute T 2 in the expression for T 1 to get the unique value of
T 1. Also note that computing the value of b1, b2, T 1 and T 2 is equivalent to solving
a linear program.
Step 3: Since games AG2 and AG1 are strategically equivalent, we can use the
result of Step 2 to obtain the Nash equilibrium strategies of the players for game
AG1.
The proof of Part 2 of the lemma is thus complete.
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